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Factors Influencing Southern Dairy
Farmers’ Choice of Milk Handlers
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Abstracl
Survey data of 2,538 dairy farmers located in 12 southern states were used to analyzethe
factors influencingfarmers’choice of milk handlers. Resultsfrom a qualitativeresponsemodel
indicate that a combination of price and non-price factors contribute to dairy farmers’ attitudes
toward their milk handlers. Specifically, the decision to change milk handlers was significantly
influenced by prices paid and deductions charged. However, non-price factors including field
services, friendly personnel, and loyalty to a handler contributed to the longer term affiliation of
dairy farmers with their milk handlers.
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Dairy farmers have the option of selling their
milk through several types of marketing firms.
Broadly categorized, these are milk marketing
cooperatives and proprietary handlers,
Cooperatives, with or without processing facilities,
generally guarantee a market for their members’
milk. They may also provide their customers with
an agreed-upon supply of milk and various
marketing services through a contractual
arrangement. Proprietary handlers, who may
purchase all their milk direct from dairy farmers or
who may purchase up to 100 percent from
cooperatives, may provide some of the same
services, but are not obligated to do so.
Hypothetically, the dairy farmers chose a specific
milk handler by assessing the benefits of these
services and by evaluating the overall performance
of alternative marketing firms.
The primary objective of this paper is to
identi& the factors that may be important in
influencing southern dairy farmers’ decision to
change or not to change milk handlers.
Identification of the factors contributing to a
long-term affiliation with the same milk handler by
dairy farmers will provide beneficial information for
long-term planning by cooperative organizations and
proprietary firms. This may result in improved
market stability and efficiency.
Milk cooperatives perhaps had their greatest
success in the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, dairy
farm dissatisfaction with the overall performance
and services of the cooperatives seems to have
increased. In 1987, of the 21,1 billion pounds of
the Grade A milk sold to plants and dealers in the
south, 79 percent was sold through milk marketing
cooperatives and 21 percent was sold directly to
proprietary handlers. This compares with 83
percent of the 20.1 billion pounds sold through
.cooperatives in 1980 (Liebrand, Carley, and Ling).
In the four-state east-south-central region (Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee), two-thirds
of the milk was sold through cooperatives in 1987
compared with 84 percent in 1980. The decrease in
the percentage of milk marketed by cooperatives
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suggests that some dairy farmers have changed their
buyer affiliation to proprietary milk buyers,
The marketwide services performed in the
process of farm assembly of milk, hauling to the
processing location, and balancing processors needs
with the supply from farmers may be costly
(Manchester). When farmer-member milk
production is less than needed to satisfy customer
needs, cooperatives encounter added supply costs.
In periods of milk surplus, cooperatives must
dispose of the surplus and pay the costs,
Cooperative members, if not compensated by the
ultimate buyers, bear the additional cost of supply
balancing. This becomes a deduction from the price
they receive for milk. Dairy farmers selling to
proprietary handlers avoid the supply balancing
costs.
Because of milk supply balancing and its
costs, processing costs, and market competition
faced by cooperatives, there has been at times a
disparity in prices received by cooperative members
and farmers selling direct to proprietary handlers.
The price received by southern dairy farmers who
sold milk to cooperatives ranged from $0,12 to
$0.67 per cwt less than farmers who sold milk to
proprietary handlers (Carley). Prices that do not
recognize differences in the services rendered can
accelerate dairy farmer dissatisfaction and distort
competitive relationships among dairy farmers,
proprietary milk handlers and cooperatives (Carley
et al.).
Price and income disparity among dairy
farmers influences choices of affiliating with
cooperatives versus proprietary handlers. Dairy
farmers may change milk handlers depending on the
price received, marketing costs and deductions, and
the various non-price service functions that are
performed. Berry, Dabney and Voth estimated that
a cooperative may pay a difference of about $0,20
per cwt lower in the price to dairy farmers without
losing members to other handlers that pay higher
prices.
In a study of dairy farmers in the northeastern
United States, several reasons for switching milk
handlers were identified. These included the special
assessment charged by cooperatives, reblended
prices after deductions, prices too low, excessive
hauling costs, and inadequate provision of on-farm
services (Wilkins and Stafford). Similar reasons
were identified to affect southern dairy farmers’
degree of satisfaction with a milk handler. Southern
dairy farmers indicated that the price received,
assessments and deductions, market assurance, and
hauling costs were most important in affecting the
degree of satisfaction with a milk handler (Liebrand,
Carley, and Ling).
In an analysis of data obtained from a national
survey, factors influencing dairy farmers in
switching milk handlers were (1) to get a better
price, (2) to reduce risk of market payment loss, (3)
the plant closed, (4) to reduce hauling costs, (5) to
obtain more accurate weights and tests, and (6) to
obtain better field services (Boynton and Babb).
Liebrand and Ling observed that dairy farmers
may accept lower prices in return for an assured
market for their milk. Jensen further observed that
farmer chose between cooperatives and proprietary
handlers because of an assured market and better
services as opposed to higher prices and lower
deductions.
Conceptual Relationships and Methodology
Dairy farmers make an important decision
when they choose a milk handler. Assuming that
dairy farmers have objectives other than profit
maximization, their choice of milk handlers may be
hypothesized to be based on the premise of utility
maximization. Based on the premise of utility
maximization, dairy farmers may assess several
factors dealing with income maximization, risk
minimization, and satisfaction maximization in order
to maximize utility. Dairy farmers’ desire to
maximize income to the dairy farm operation is
influenced by prices received, the amount of
assessments and deductions, and hauling rates.
Factors that lead to risk minimization are the
stability and security of the milk handler to pay for
the milk and the assurance that the milk will be
purchased. Factors that relate to satisfaction are the
capability and friendliness of milk handler
personnel, the degree of loyalty that increases over
time, and the kind of on-farm field services
provided by the milk handler, Conceptually, there
should exist some combination of levels of the
factors contributing to income maximization, risk
minimization, and satisfaction maximization that
maximizes a farmer’s utility.J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993
Given the nature of the study and the
assumption that a combination of several factors
exists that maximizes a farmer’s utility, a qualitative
choice model is utilized in the analysis. This
methodology, based on the premise of random
utility maximization developed by McFadden,
provides the appropriate theoretical foundation for
model formulation,
Consider a sample of T dairy farmers, each
facing a set of M discrete alternatives. Each
alternative i(i = 1, .... M) provides utility, Ui, to
farmer t(t = 1, .... T). A dairy farmer is said to
choose an alternative i that maximizes his utility
among the M alternatives. The maximum utility
attainable given each alternative i can be expressed
as:
Ui = u(Ak, $), k = 1, .... ~ n= 1, ..,, N. (1)
Where Ui is the maximum utility attainable when
alternative i is chosen; Ak is a vector of K attributes
or characteristics associated with alternative t and
S. is a vector of N socioeconomic characteristics of
farmer t. For estimation purposes, the u(.) is
assumed to be a linear function of Ak and Sn,and it
can be decomposed into a deterministic component
(Ak, Sn;@)iand a stochastic component (~i). Thus,
equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Ui = (Ak, Sn;@)l+ ~i, (2)
where @ is a vector of parameters associated with
Ak and Sn.
In the decision-making process, the dairy
farmer is assumed to evaluate and compare the
utility derived from each alternative i as specified in
(2). An individual will choose alternative j, if and
only if it provides the highest utility.
(.JJ ~max (Ui I i = 1, .... M, j # i). (3)
In practice, Uj represents a latent variable, which is
unobservable, and only the outcome of the decision
process is observed. Thus, let Y be the observed
variable that is ordinal in nature and Y = j is the
observed outcome when response category j is
chosen.
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In this analysis there are only two choices.
The dependent variable, Y,, equals one (Y, = 1) if
the dairy farmer reported to have changed milk
handler and (Y,= O)otherwise, Thus, the regression
relation implied by equation (3) can be specified as
a probit model and estimated with appropriate
statistical procedures:
Yt= X,p+ Et, (4)
and
Pr(Yt= 1) = 1- @(-X,~), (5)
where XLis a matrix of explanatory variables that
represent Ak and Snin equation (2) and P is a vector
of unknown parameters; et is a vector of error
terms assumed to be independently and identically
normally distributed, i.e., et - N(O, 02); and cD(.)
denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution
function.
The coefficient vector ~ is estimated using
maximum likelihood estimation. Maximum
likelihood estimation computes the value of ~ that
maximizes the log-likelihood function:
log L = Z,.,,,,,,~ Y,log O(X,B) +
at=,,,,,,T(1-Y*)log [1-qx,p)] (6)
Consistent parameter estimates for the ~ vector that
maximize the log-likelihood function can be
obtained by applying the probit procedure available
in the LIMDEP computer package (Greene).
The Variables and the Data
Data for the study were obtained from dairy
farmers located in 12 southern states, Agricultural
economists located in each state chose a random
sample of Grade A dairy farmers located in their
state. A questionnaire was mailed to 5,660 dairy
farmers in the region early in 1989. Useable
responses were obtained from 2,538 dairy farmers
for a 44.8 percent return. The responses represented
approximately 25 percent of the total Grade A dairy
farmers in the 12-state region, The general
characteristics of the dairy farmers who responded
to the survey are shown in table 1.200 Misra, Car[ey and Fletcher: Factors [njluerrcing Southern Duity Farmers’
Table 1. Simple Statistics of tbe southern Dairy Farmers Responding to the Survey
.-—
Item unit Value
Type of rnitk handler
Bargaining cooperative no. farrnera 657
Bargaining-operating cooperative no. farmers 1423
Proprietary no. fsrrners 427
Not ckaified no. f~rx 31


























No no. farmers 2,003
Yes no. fanners 447
Type of handler change
C&0p to CO-op % farmers 39
Co-optoprop. %farmers 29
Prop. to co-0p % farmers 18
Prop. to prop. % farmers 14
Respondents were asked to indicate whether
they have changed milk handlers during the last five
years. Of the 2,450 responses, 447 indicated that
they had changed handlers.’ Of the farmers that
changed handlers in the past five years, 39 percent
changed from one cooperative to another, 18percent
of the farmers changed from a proprietary handler
to a cooperative, and 29 percent changed from a
cooperative to a proprietary handler. The remaining
14 percent of the farmers changed from one
proprietary handler to another proprietary handler.
The dairy farmers were asked to rate the
degree of influence of various reasons for changing
or not changing milk handlers in an ordered
sequence of strong; moderate; weak; and none. The
major reasons listed in the survey were the
influence of (1) importance of price received, (2)
importance of special assessments and deductions,
(3) favorable or excessive hauling charges, (4) field
or on-farm services offered by the milk handler, (5)
friendly personnel, and (6) loyalty to the handler.
The degree of influence of the above factors
in the milk producer’s decision to change or not
change a handler reveals some noticeable
differences (table 2). Farmers who changed
handlers were clearly influenced by the importance
of prices received and deductions charged.
However, producers who did not change milk
handlers seem to be more influenced by favorable
hauling ,charges, on-farm services, friendly
personnel, and loyalty toward the handler.
Respondents were also asked to indicate what
percent of the sales value would they be able to
retain (after all debts had been paid) if they sold
their entire farming operation. Of 2,416 responding
to this question, 6 percent of the dairy farmers
indicated that their debt exceeded assets and about
20 percent were debt free. Among the remaining
respondents, the debt-asset ratio of 63 percent of the
milk producers was less than 0,5.J. A~r. and Applied Econ., July, 1993 201
Table2. Percentage of Dairy Farmers Expreasiog Degree of Influence of tbe Following Factors on tbe De&ion
to Ctmege or Not to Change Milk Handlers
Delrree of Urfhlence
@xors Strom? Moderate weak None
----------------------- percent ---------------------
Price
Cbnoge 45 9 3 43
Non-change 30 34 8 28
Deductions
C&urge 25 12 5 58
Non-change 15 34 13 38
Hauling charges
Cbarrge 14 11 6 69
Non-cbartge 32 32 10 26
Field services
Cbarrge 10 7 6 77
Non-ebaoge 35 25 10 30
Frieodly personnel
Cbaoge 14 6 3 77
Non-change 44 27 6 23
Loyalty
Change 8 7 3 82
No -cban e ~ 25 9 34
Model Specification
For this analysis of dairy farmer affiliation
with milk handlers, due to exclusion of respondents
who failed to provide complete answers to a number
of questions used in the variable construction, data
were available for 2020 dairy farmers, Based on
the conceptional relationships, variables were
identified that provide reasons for southern dairy
farmers changing or selling to the same milk
handler. Changing or not changing was the
dependent variable. Variables selected to explain
the choice made by the dairy farmers were one set
of variables related to the characteristics of the dairy
farmers including the debt-asset level of the farmer,
the size of the daity herd, and the age of the
principal operator.
Dairy farmers with a high debt to asset
relationship may be expected to change milk
handlers if they believed it would improve their
income by receiving a higher price for their milk.
Therefore, the higher the ratio, the more likely the
farmer would change milk handlers. That dairy
farmers with larger herds may be more likely to
change handlers as they seek higher milk prices and
lower marketing costs. Also, milk handlers may
attempt to get larger producers to sell to them since
it may reduce field man and other marketing costs,
Older dairy farmers were expected to be less likely
to change handlers than younger ones as they
probably had sold to the same buyer longer and
they probably are less likely to desire a change.
Another set of variables were related to the
influence of milk handler monetary factors on dairy
farmers opinions including low prices versus better
prices, high versmslow deductions and assessments
and excessive versus favorable hauling charges. A
group of non-monetary factors included the field
services offered, the friendliness of handler
personnel, and loyalty to versus personal problems
with the handler.
Receiving low prices, deductions and
assessments that were believed too high, and
excessive hauling charges might influence a dairy
farmer to change handlers. Likewise, poor field202 Misra, Carley and Fletcher: Factors Injlaeneing Southern Dairy Farmers’
Table 3. Defirution and Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Model
..,.—
Sksmiard
Variable Definition Mean dewatton
State Dummies
Georgia If reapnndent is from a specified state = 1;
























If debt exceeds or equals ssset themDebt = 1,
if debt ssset ratio (alar) = .9 to .76 then Debt = 2,
if dsr = .75 to .51 then Debt = 3,
if dsr = .50 to .26 theo Debt = 4,
ifdsr = .2S to .01 then Debt = 5,
if debt free than Debt = 6,
Influenw of the fsctnr on the desision tn change
or not to chsnge; 1 = none, 2 = wink, 3 = mnderate,
and 4 = strong.
If tbe size of the dawy herd is 100 or k = 1;
O olber-wk.
If tbe size of the dairy herd is 101 to 200 = 1;
O otherwise.
If the size of the dairy herd is 201 to 300 = 1;
Ootherwise.




















he Actual see of tire respondent in vears. 46.874 12.139
services, non-friendly personnel, and a lack of
loyalty to a handler may influence a dairy farmer to
change handlers. In addition, the state location of
the dairy farmer was included as a variable, Table
3 presents a summary of variable definitions and
related descriptive statistics.
Empirical Results
The estimation results from the probit model
are presented in table 4. In addition, several
goodness-of-fit measures are reported. One measure
is the log-likelihood ratio. A second measure used
is the pseudo-R2 (Maddala, p. 40). A third measure
examines how well the model classified the
respondents correctly based on the estimated
probabilities. These measures indicate that the
model had satisfactory explanatory power and fitted
the data reasonably well. The results suggest that
the overall ability of the model to yield correct
predictions on dairy farmers’ decision to change
handlers was 88 percent.J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993
Table 4. Pmblt Munatea andtbe Probabditwx of Changing Milk Handlers
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Estunated significance

































Hauhng cbargea = 1
Hauling charges = 2
Hsuhg charges = 3
Hauhng CbW&9 = 4
FIELD SERVICE.S
Field servwa = 1
Field services .2
Field setvices .3
Field sem- = 4
FRIENDLY PERSONNEL















































































































PelT-mtw rrectlv Cias.slfied = 88
For the C.MIKIUOUS variable Age, tbe value shown ISdte probabihty denvatwe. For all other di~rete vm’abl~,
the vahm shown are the actual pmbabditlea ns.wctated WKSIthe vanabk.
& The Itkelihood mt!o statwlc IS distributed as ChI-squ.are WIfb 22 degrees of freedom and is .mgmficant al the
.01 Slgnttimme level.204 Misra, Car[ey und Fletcher: Factors lnjlaencing Soathern Dally Farmers’
Geographic Difference
Many of the estimated coefficients were
statistically significantly different from zero at the
ten percent significance level. The coefficient
estimates for the state variables indicate that dairy
farmers in Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Tennessee aremore likely to change
handlers than those dairy farmers in Georgia.
Further, the likelihood of not changing handlers is
higher in Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia than in Georgia.
However, the estimated coefficients for Florida,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia were not statistically
significantly different from zero at the ten percent
significance level. This result could have
connotation regarding the performance of the
cooperatives or proprietary handlers in an individual
state. Dissatisfaction of farmers with the
performance of their current handler may be a
sufficient reason to change handlers.
Debt
The negative sign for the debt variable
suggests that farmers with more favorable debt-to-
asset levels are less likely to change handlers. A
possible explanation for this relationship between
debt and likelihood of changing handlers may be
that farmers with higher debts were more likely to
actively explore the alternatives to maximize income
of their dairy farm operation such as changing to
another handler who may pay a higher price.
Herd Size
The coefficient estimates of the herd size
variables indicate that larger operations are more
likely to change handlers, The estimated sign
associated with dairy herds of more than 300 cows
(HS4) was positive implying that dairy farmers with
this herd size were more likely to change handlers
than farmers with up to 100 coWS. The positive
sign for the variable representing 101 to 200 cows
(HS2) (statistically significant at the. 13significance
level) also supports the hypothesis that larger
operations are more Iikely to change handlers.
However, the estimated coefficient associated with
dairy herds of 201 to 300 cows (HS3) was not
statistical y significantly different from zero. A few
cents more per hundredweight of milk from higher
prices, lower deductions, and lower hauling charges
resulting in greater absolute income from the larger
herds may have influenced the changes. Even
though some milk handlers may seek out the larger
herds, this was not evident in this study as there
was no statistically significant difference in herd
size distribution among various milk handlers. In
addition, results show that older dairy farmers were
less likely to change handlers than their younger
counterparts.
Price and Deduction
Results show that dairy farmers’ decision to
change handlers is significantly influenced by prices
paid and deductions charged by the handlers. The
estimated signs associated with both price and
deductions variables were positive implying that
dairy farmers were more likely to change milk
handlers if they believed their prices received were
too low and/or deductions were too high. Wilkins
and Stafford, and Boynton and Babb also identified
similar reasons for changing handlers. With respect
to hauling charges, the results suggested that
favorable hauling charges had more influence on the
farmers’ decision to not change handlers, rather than
the decision to change,
Non-Price Service Factors
All the non-price service factors (field
services, friendly personnel, and loyalty) were found
to be statistically significant in the dairy farmers’
decision of not changing handlers. The negative
effects associated with field services, friendly
personnel, and loyalty suggest that these non-price
factors contribute to the longer term affiliation of
the farmers to their milk handlers.
For qualitative choice models, the estimated
coefficients should be interpreted in the sense that
they affect the probability that certain events would
occur. This interpretation can be obtained by
computing the probability y derivatives (marginal
probabilities) from the estimated model. The
marginal probability is used to measure the change
in probability y of each choice with respect to a
change in explanatory variable. The probability
derivatives for binary variables, however, do not
exist. Therefore, the predicted probability for a
given binary variable was calculated by holding all
other variables at their sample means. TheJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993 205
estimated marginal probabilities and probabilities
are presented in the last column in table 4.
Probability of Changing Handlers
Farmers of Alabama and Tennessee had the
highest probability of changing handlers. The
probability of changing handlers was the lowest for
the dairy farmers in Arkansas. The probabilities
associated with the debt variable suggest that as the
debt-to-asset ratio of the farmer improves, the
probability of changing handlers decreases. A
farmer whose debts exceed assets has a probability
of 0.59 of being willing to change handlers.
However, for those who are free from debts, the
estimated probability of changing handlers is
considerably less (0.44).
With respect to the price and deductions
variables, the results suggest that those farmers who
attached more importance to a higher price received
and lower deduction charges, the probability of
changing handlers increased significantly. In
contrast, those dairy farmers who attached more
importance to hauling charges, field services,
friendly personnel, and loyalty, the probability of
changing handlers decreased, For example, farmers
who considered field services offered to be a very
important factor had a probability of about .56 of
changing handlers in comparison to a probability of
as high as .76 for farmers who considered field
services not important.
The estimated probabilities also suggest that
larger dairy farm operations have a higher
probability of changing handlers. In particular,
farmers with more than 300 head had a probability
of about .11 in comparison to a probability of .06
for those who had up to 100 head. The probability
derivative of -.0014 for the age variable indicates
that each one year increase in the age of a dairy
farmer decreases the probability of changing
handlers by .0014, This result suggests that as the
dairy farmer gets older he is less likely to change
handlers.
Summary and Conclusions
Most southern dairy farmers have the
opportunity to sell their milk to more than one
handler. They may change handlers depending on
several income, risk, and satisfaction factors.
However, changing milk handlers may result in
some degree of organizational and market instability
among dairy farmers and dairy farmer organizations.
A survey of dairy farmers located in 12
southern states indicated that 18 percent of 2,450
farmers had changed milk handlers during the
previous five years. Six major reasons for changing
or not changing milk handlers were the influence of
price received, assessments and deductions, hauling
charges, on-farm field services, friendliness of
handler personnel and loyalty to the handler.
A qualitative choice model was used to
determine the degree to which a set of alternatives
influenced dairy farmers to change or not change
milk handlers. Dairy farmers located in Alabama
and Tennessee had the highest probabilities for
changing handlers while those located in Arkansas,
Florida, and Texas had the lowest probabilities for
changing handlers.
Dairy farmers with Iessfavorable asset-to-debt
levels were more likely to change handlers. This
implies they may have been seeking factors that
may improve their income such as price received,
level of deductions, and hauling charges. Dairy
farmers with larger herds had a higher probability of
changing handlers than those with smaller herds.
The decision to change handlers was
significantly influenced by prices paid and
deductions charged by handlers. However, hauling
charges had more influence on not changing
handlers, Non-price factors including field services,
friendly personnel, and loyalty to a handler were
important variables in the dairy farmers’ decisions
to not change handlers. Positive effects associated
with non-price factors contributed to the longer term
affiliation of dairy farmers with their milk handlers.
This result supports the finding that dairy farmers
may accept lower prices for their milk in return for
an assured market and other non-price factors and
reinforces the hypothesis that the dairy farmers are
not solely profit maximizers.
The results of this study show evidence that a
combination of price and non-price factors
contribute to dairy farmers’ attitudes toward their
milk handlers. Milk prices, deductions, and milk
hauling charges are important to dairy farmers but
not necessarily the only factors resulting in206 Misru, Curley and Fletcher: Factors lnflaerwing Southern Dairy Farmers’
organizational and market stability, Milk handlers
must consider a bundle of price and non-price
factors as they seek to maintain a stable supply of
milk to meet their everyday customer needs in the
marketplace. While cooperatives must maintain a
competitive price structure to attract or retain
members, they must also be competitive in terms of
costs of operation and other non-price services,
Further, milk handlers in need of milk should target
younger and larger producers as potential recruits
because they will have a higher probability of
success.
indicate the decision-making process of a dairy
farmer that leads to maximization of the utility
among several alternatives in choosing a milk
handler. However, conclusions and implications to
be drawn from this study are limited by the
geographical coverage of the survey. Attempts to
generalize and apply the results of this study to a
broader context should be exercised with caution.
In addition, it is recognized that the study did not
explore why some farmers attach more importance
to financial factors than others. The availability of
this information would provide further insight for
studying milk producers’ decision-making processes.
This study, using the qualitative choice model,
provided a method to identify those factors that
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